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Abstract
The stabilization e¤ect of nonlinear income taxation is addressed in the standard
model of small open economy. It is shown that if income taxation schedule is progressive,
the small open economy tends hold saddle-point stability. On the other hand, if taxation
on the interest income is regressive, then the small open economy may exhibit sunspot-
driven uctuations or it displays a diverging behavior.
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1 Introduction
In a well-cited article, Guo and Lansing (1998) reveal that progressive income taxation may
contribute to stabilizing closed economy models with production externalities. Those authors
introduce a nonlinear taxation rule into the model of Behhabib and Farmer (1994), and show
that the progressive tax schedule narrows the parameter space in which equilibrium indeter-
minacy emerges. Many authors have re-examined Guo and Lansings nding in alternative
settings1. The foregoing studies, however, have focused on closed economy models, and the
stabilization e¤ect of taxation rule in open economies has not been explored well2. In this
paper, we introduce nonlinear taxation schemes into an otherwise standard, one-sector model
of small open economy. We show that under progressive taxation, equilibrium indeterminacy
will not hold. In contrast, if a regressive taxation rule is applied to the interest income of -
nancial asset, then the small open economy exhibits sunspot-driven uctuations or it displays
a diverging behavior.
2 Model
Consider a small open economy in which the representative rm produces a homogeneous
good according to the production function such as
yt = Ak
a
t
k"t ; 0 < a < 1; " > 0;
where yt and kt respectively denote output and capital per labor, and kt is the average capital
labor ratio. Here, k"t represents external e¤ects generated by the social level of capital in the
sense of Romer (1986). We normalize the total labor to one, so that in equilibrium it holds
that kt = kt: Hence, the social production function is yt = Ak

t ; where  = a+ ": We assume
that  = a+ " < 1; meaning that the social level of capital exhibits diminishing returns. The
factor markets are competitive, so that the rate of return to private capital, rt; and the real
1A sample includes Dromel and Pintus (2008), Guo and Harrison (2015), Chen and Guo (2016), and Chen,
Hus and Hus (2018).
2A recent contribution by Huang, Meng and Xue (2017) examine stabilization e¤ect of the balanced-budget
rule in a small open economy. Chapter 6 of Mino (2017) presents an overview of equilibrium indeterminacy
in open economy models.
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wage, wt, are respectively given by
rt = aAk
 1
t ; wt = (1  a)Ak

t : (1)
There is a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. The representative house-
hold freely lends to or borrows from the foreign households. The households optimization
problem is as follows:
max
Z 1
0
e t log ctdt
subject to
_bt = (1  y;t)(rtkt + wt) + (1   b;t)Rbt   ct  
 
it
kt
+

2

it
kt
2!
kt;  > 0; (2)
_kt = it   kt; (3)
together with given initial levels of k0 and b0: In the above, bt = holding of foreign bond
(net asset position) ; R = a given world interest rate, it = investment spending on capital,
 = depreciation rate of capital, and (=2) (it=kt)
2
t kt represents adjustment costs of capital. In
addition, y;t and  b;t denote the rates of tax on domestic income and interest income earned
from bond holding, respectively. In this paper, we assume that the domestic households are
creditors, and thus, bt has a non-negative value.
The scal authority sets the rates of tax in such a way that
y;t = 1  y (rtkt + wt)
 y ; y < 1; y > 0;
 b;t = 1  b (Rbt)
 b ; b < 1; b > 0:
As a result, the after-tax incomes are expressed in the following manner:
(1  y;t) (rtkt + wt) = y (rtkt + wt)
1 y (4)
(1   b;t)Rbt = bR
1 bb
1 b
t : (5)
Note that if 0 < y < 1 and 0 < b < 1; then the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax
rate, so that tax schedules are progressive and the after-tax marginal incomes decrease with
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rtkt+wt and bt: On the other hand, if y < 0 and  b < 0; then the marginal rates of tax are
smaller than the average rates of tax, implying that tax schedules are regressive3.
Given above assumptions, the Hamiltonian function for the households problem is given
by
Ht = log ct + t
"
y(rtkt + wt)
1 y + bR
1 bb
1 b
t   ct  
 
it
kt
+

2

it
kt
2!
kt
#
+qt (it   kt) ;
where t and qt denote the utility prices of capital and nancial asset, respectively. The
necessary conditions for an optimum include the following:
ct =
1
t
; (6)
qt = t

1 + 
it
kt

; (7)
_t = t
h
  (1  b) bR
1 bb
 b
t
i
; (8)
_qt = (+ ) qt   t
" 
1  y

y (rtkt + wt)
 y rt +

2

it
kt
2#
; (9)
together with the transversality conditions: limt!1 e
 ttbt = 0 and limt!1 e
 tqtkt = 0:
It is to be noted that if a at rate of tax is applies to the interest income, that is,
b = 0; then (8) becomes
_t = t (  bR) : Therefore, we should assume that  = bR in
order to dene the steady state equilibrium. In this standard case, the steady state level of bt
depends on its initial level of b0: Such a zero-root problem (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003)
can be avoided in our setting4.
3Noting that rtkt + wt = yt; we see that the governments tax revenue on domestic income is y;tyt =
yt   yy
1 y
t and the marginal tax revenue is
d
dyt
(y;tyt) = 1   y
 
1  y

y
 y
t : Thus, if 0 < y < 1 
resp. y < 0

; then the marginal tax revenue is higher (resp. lower) than the average tax revenue
= y;t = 1  yy
 y
t

, so that taxation scheme is progressive (resp. regressive). The same property holds
for the taxation on the interest income.
4 In discrete time models, the non-stationarity of small open economy models with free capital mobility is
called the unit-root problem. See also Lubick (2007).
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3 Tax Schedule and Equilibrium (In)determinacy
Dene vt = qt=t: Then, using (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; (6) ; (7) ; (8) ; (9) and rtkt + wt = yt = Ak

t ; we
can derive a complete dynamic system as follows:
_bt = bR
1 bb
1 b
t + yA
1 yk
(1 y)
t   ct  

1

(vt   1) +
1
2
(vt   1)
2

kt; (10)
_vt =
h
 + (1  b) bR
1 bb
 b
t
i
vt  
1
2
(vt   1)
2
  a
 
1  y

yA
1 yk
(1 y) 1
t ; (11)
_kt =

1

(vt   1)  

kt; (12)
_ct = ct
h
(1  b) bR
1 bb
 b
t   
i
: (13)
In the steady state, it holds that _bt = _vt = kt = _ct = 0: We denote the steady state values of
endogenous variables by b; v; k and c: Those steady state values fulll the following:
yA
1 yk(1 y) + bR
1 bb1 b = c +

1

(v   1) +
1
2
(v   1)2

k; (14)
h
 + (1  b) bR
1 bb b
i
v =
1
2
(v   1)2 + a
 
1  y

yA
1 yk(1 y) 1; (15)
1

(v   1) = ; (16)
(1  b) bR
1 b (b) b = : (17)
Conditions (16) and (17) respectively give the unique steady state levels of vt and bt: Then
(16) determines a unique steady state level of kt: Finally, the steady state level of ct is given
by (14) : As mentioned above, the steady state value of bt is independent of its initial value.
We conduct linear approximation of the dynamic system at the steady state equilibrium.
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Then we nd that the coe¢cient matrix of the linearized system is written as follows:
J =
2666666666664
  

1

+ 

k 
 
1  y

yA
1 y(k)(1 y) 1   

1 +

2

 1
 b

b
v   a
 
1  y
 

 
1  y

  1

yA
1 y(k)(1 y) 2 0
0
k

0 0
 b

b
c 0 0 0
3777777777775
:
It is straightforward to show that the determinant of J is given by
det J =  b

b
c
k

a
 
1  y
 

 
1  y

  1

yA
1 y (k)(1 y) 2 :
Since y < 1; the above expression leads to
sign det J = sign b

1  
 
1  y

: (18)
Therefore, if taxations on the domestic income and the interest income are progressive, i.e.,
0 < y; b < 1; then det J > 0: Alternatively, if tax schemes are regressive (i.e., y < 0 and
b < 0) and if 
 
1  y

> 1; then it also holds that det J > 0: Keeping in mind that the
product and the sum of eigenvalues are respectively equal det J and the trace of J; in those
alternative cases, the number of stable root is either zero or two. Since the dynamic system
involves two jump variables, ct and vt; if det J > 0; indeterminacy will not arise. On the other
hand, either if b < 0 and 1 > 
 
1  y

or if b > 0 and 1 < 
 
1  y

; then det J < 0;
meaning that the number of stable roots is either one or three. In the former case, there is
no converging path towards the steady state equilibrium, while the latter case means that
equilibrium indeterminacy arises.
To conduct a further investigation on the stability conditions, we inspect some numerical
examples. We set baseline parameters in the following manner:
 = 0:02; R = 0:03;  = 0:1;  = 1; A = 1:0; a = 0:3;  = a+ " = 0:4:
The magnitudes of the parameters shown above are standard ones. We rst assume that
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taxation is progressive and set the degree of progressiveness of taxation as b = y = 0:3:
We also set y = 1:0 and b = 1:0 to make the steady state levels of average tax, 

v =
1  y (y
) y and b = 1  b (Rb
) b feasible ones. Given our specication, we nd:
b = 39:22; v = 1:1; k = 2:991; c = 0:953; y = 0:123; 

b = 0:667:
Evaluating J based on the parameter values and the steady state values of endogenous vari-
ables listed above, we nd that J has four real eigenvalues and two of them are negative5.
Hence, in the base line case, there is a unique converting path towards the steady state
equilibrium, so that determinacy is established. We change y and b within the rage of
[0:1; 0:5] and adjust y and b to hold 

y; 

b 2 (0; 1) : We see that there always exists a two-
dimensional stable manifold around the steady state. Therefore, it is safe to state that under
progressive income taxation, the small open economy is generally free from sunspot-driven
business cycles.
Next, let us consider the case in which the tax schemes are slightly regressive. In so doing,
we set y = b =  0:1; y = 0:8; and b = 0:7: Here, we we obtain:
b = 0:228; v = 1:1; k = 2:941; c = 0:595; y = 0:164; 

b = 0:576:
In this case, we nd that J has one positive and one negative real eigenvalues. In addition,
J has conjugate complex eigenvalues with negative real parts6. Hence, there are three stable
roots, which gives rise to local indeterminacy. We change y and b within the range of
[ 0:4;  0:1] and adjust y and b to hold 

y; 

b 2 (0; 1) ; which leads to the same outcome.
However, we also nd that if b < 0 but y > 0
 
for example, b =  0:1 and y = 0:3

; then
J generally has three unstable eigenvalues, meaning that there is no converging path leading
to the steady state.
5The eigenvalues of J in the baseline case of progressive taxation are: 0:324 26; 0:0254;  0:05 4; and
 0:304 25
6 In the case of regressive tax on the intret income , the eigenbalues of J are: 0:00916;  0:01039 +
053626i;  0:01039  053626i; and
 0:0:03049.
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4 Conclusion
This paper addresses the stabilization e¤ect of nonlinear income taxation in a small open
economy with free capital mobility. We show that as conrmed by Guo and Lansing (1998)
in the context of a closed economy model, progressive taxation contributes to establishing
equilibrium determinacy in our small open economy. In contrast, when a regressive tax
scheme is applied to the interest income, the small open economy may hold sunspot-driven
uctuations. Otherwise, the economy exhibits a diverging behavior. Therefore, a regressive
tax schedule on the interest income makes the small open economy unstable in both senses7.
7Chen, Hu and Mino (2018) examine the stabilization e¤ect of nonlinear income taxation in a wide class of
small open economy models such as models with variable labor supply and models with endogenous growth.
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